For Filipinos watching the slow erosion of trust in elections, institutions, and regional stability, the turmoil unfolding in Honduras should feel familiar. More than a week after voters went to the polls, the country still has no declared president. Repeated failures in the election results transmission system froze the count, revived memories of past disputed elections, and triggered accusations of manipulation that have deepened public distrust in state institutions.

At first glance, Honduras may seem far removed from Philippine political realities. Yet the forces shaping its current crisis mirror those confronting Manila today: fragile electoral systems, external geopolitical pressure, and the growing costs of reliance on China. Beneath the procedural chaos, Honduras is reassessing its alignment with Beijing after discovering that promised economic gains failed to materialize, while political leverage and external scrutiny intensified instead.

This dilemma is not unique to Latin America. It echoes the Philippines’ own experience in the West Philippine Sea, where China’s economic engagement has coexisted with coercive behavior, and where Manila continues to balance development needs against sovereignty, democratic credibility, and alliance commitments.

Honduras’ debate is therefore not a distant case study, but a warning, and a mirror, for the Philippines.

The scale of Honduras’ crisis becomes clearer when placed in context. In 2017, severe irregularities in the vote count led the Organization of American States to question the legitimacy of the election and recommend that the process be repeated after the National Party candidate Juan Orlando Hernández was declared the winner. The current stalemate has revived those memories, once again fueling accusations of manipulation in favor of National Party candidate Nasry Asfura and deepening public distrust in state institutions.

The election has also drawn unusual international attention. The United States has closely monitored the process as part of its broader effort to curb Chinese influence in the region, an interest underscored when US President Donald Trump publicly signaled support for the National Party candidate days before the vote.

Honduras recognized the People’s Republic of China in 2023 with expectations of major investment and expanded market access. Those gains never arrived. High-profile projects stalled, trade agreements failed to materialize, and agricultural producers who hoped for relief saw no measurable improvement. Even the shrimp sector, a pillar of Honduras’ export economy, found that China’s market did not deliver the opportunities advertised at the time of diplomatic recognition. The frustration ran so deep that both major opposition parties announced during the campaign that they would restore formal ties with Taiwan if elected.

China’s unfulfilled pledges

The pattern is unmistakable: investment pledges that remain unfulfilled, paired with rising political and economic pressure. Diplomatic outreach brought fanfare, but not the tangible benefits needed to justify alignment.

A Honduran reversal toward Taiwan would mark the first time in nearly two decades that a country formally reconsiders its switch to Beijing.

For the Philippines, the strategic message is clear. China’s influence is not guaranteed, and its model carries reputational and political costs that are becoming harder for smaller states to absorb. In both regions, Beijing’s ability to sustain partnerships depends not on rhetoric but on real economic outcomes, and on whether coercive tactics undermine the goodwill it seeks to build.

Honduras’ experience also highlights the vulnerability that follows recognition of Beijing.

When countries attempt to step away, China often responds with economic pressure. Japan faced seafood import bans. Lithuania saw its exports delayed at Chinese ports. Australia endured tariffs on wine, barley, and coal after political disagreements. The Philippines, meanwhile, has experienced harassment of its vessels, dangerous maneuvers in disputed areas of the South China Sea, and threats linked to its defense cooperation with the United States. These tactics vary in form but share a common objective: raising the cost of independent decision-making.

With its small, agriculture-dependent economy, Honduras is highly exposed to such pressure. The Philippines, despite being far larger faces a parallel dilemma: strategic dependence on China in some sectors and strategic vulnerability to China in others. Manila’s experience in the West Philippine Sea is, in many ways, the maritime counterpart to the political and economic leverage Beijing attempted to cultivate in Honduras.

Countries can rethink alignments

Honduras’ political debate matters for the Philippines because it demonstrates that countries can rethink their alignments when promised benefits fail to materialize, and that public opinion can shift decisively when Beijing’s behavior clashes with its development narrative. It also underscores that democratic partners, whether Taiwan, Japan, or the United States, gain credibility when they deliver tangible support rather than grand announcements.

If Honduras restores ties with Taiwan, the decision will resonate across both the Atlantic and the Pacific. It will show that even states that formally recognized Beijing can walk away when the costs outweigh the gains. It will also test how China responds when a smaller nation asserts autonomy.

For Filipinos observing China’s increasingly aggressive posture in the West Philippine Sea, the lesson is unmistakable: influence rooted in coercion eventually erodes itself. Honduras may be the first country in years to challenge that model, but it will not be the last. – Rappler.com

Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos is a Honduran journalist based in Taipei. He covers Taiwan–Latin America relations, China’s regional diplomacy, and international affairs. His reporting and analysis have appeared in Nikkei Asia, The Diplomat, The Strategist (ASPI), Taipei Times, Ketagalan Media, and other outlets.