Researchers say Ethereum users could add quantum-resistant account protection for as little as $0.07, without a hard fork.
A developer known as nicocsgy published SPHINCS-, a family of EVM-optimized post-quantum signature schemes derived from SPHINCS+.
The system verifies post-quantum signatures on-chain at around 150,000 gas using only existing Ethereum infrastructure. Formal proofs via Lean 4 with Verity are included, and additional audits are in progress.
Quantum computers capable of breaking ECDSA, the signature scheme securing Ethereum and Bitcoin, are no longer a distant concern. Recent resource estimates by Babbush et al. have brought attack timelines closer than previously projected.
This makes post-quantum alternatives at the execution layer increasingly urgent for wallet holders and institutions alike. SPHINCS- addresses that gap by enabling quantum-resistant verification on Ethereum today.
The researcher shared on X: “Ethereum can already start preparing accounts for a post-quantum world, without waiting for a hard fork. Today, it would be just $0.07.”
The core technical insight came from a conversation with Vitalik Buterin. Since SPHINCS+ is built entirely from hash functions, replacing the standard SHAKE256 with Ethereum’s native KECCAK256 opcode makes on-chain verification possible.
This substitution removes any dependency on new precompiles or protocol changes. Users and organizations can therefore deploy quantum-resistant account protection right now.
Parameter tuning drove the bulk of the gas optimization work. Extensive modeling under EIP-7623 and EIP-7976 floor pricing revealed that the Winternitz parameter w=8 produces the lowest real verification cost.
Short hash chains with more iterations proved cheaper than fewer but longer chains. That finding overturned assumptions from earlier calldata-only models.
Researchers produced four main variants, each targeting a different signer profile and security requirement. The C13 variant uses WOTS+C and FORS+C compression, verifying at 127,000 gas with a 3,704-byte signature.
It suits laptop-class signers and requires around 4.3 million hash calls per signature. Organizations pursuing FIPS compliance can instead use SLH-DSA-SHA2-128-24, a standardized-style alternative.
C11 and C12 were tested on a Ledger Nano S+ ST33K1M5 secure element to assess hardware wallet viability. Signing times came in at 390 seconds and 47.5 seconds respectively, making hardware deployment realistic.
Both variants carry a reduced per-key signature budget compared to the NIST standard’s 2^64 limit. However, on-chain data shows the average active Ethereum address sends roughly 431 transactions per year, making smaller budgets sufficient.
The SLH-DSA Keccak twin cuts on-chain verification costs by around 34% against its FIPS-aligned counterpart. It trades bit-exact NIST compliance for meaningfully cheaper gas, which suits blockchain-native deployments.
Verifier contracts for all variants are publicly available on GitHub for audit and deployment. NIST is also developing smaller SLH-DSA parameter sets with a 2^24 signature budget, narrowing the gap further.
Future research targets ZK-friendly hash functions under the working name “leanSPHINCS.” That variant would support STARK-based aggregation, dropping verification to around 3,000 gas per transaction at the protocol level.
A companion post on JARDIN, expected soon, aims to cut hardware wallet signing time to three seconds. Together, these efforts position hash-based post-quantum signatures as a practical near-term path for Ethereum account security.
The post Ethereum Users Can Now Add Quantum-Resistant Account Protection for Just $0.07, Researchers Say appeared first on Blockonomi.

